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Forty years after science established that asbestos was hazardous to
humans,' the first plaintiff recovered damages against an asbestos manu-
facturer. This delay resulted from the inability of science to meet the le-
gal, "more probable than not" causation standards that require that the
effect of the hazard be quantified on humans. To determine whether ex-
posure to a substance is a statistically significant factor in the cause of a
disease, epidemiologists must compare a significant number of subjects ex-
posed to the substance to unexposed populations.2 Since the first successful
epidemiological study was completed,' over 20,000 claims have been filed
nationwide against manufacturers and installers of asbestos."
This pattern of delay is common to the toxic tort field.5 In a variety of
other cases involving such injuries as adenocarcinoma, pelvic inflam-
1. Cases of asbestosis in asbestos textile workers had been reported as early as 1924, see Cooke,
Fibrosis of the Lungs Due to the Inhalation of Asbestos Dust, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 147 (1924). Thereaf-
ter, numerous other studies indicated the significant peril of exposure to asbestos in asbestos textile
factories. For a general discussion of these studies, see Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1973) (outlining scientific history of study of effects of asbestos on
health).
2. Thus, quantification of the effects of a substance on human health is inherently retrospective.
Epidemiological studies conducted prospectively exist only insofar as test individuals are free of the
disease at the inception of the study (e.g., cohort studies)-a percentage of individuals must still be
exposed to the hazard in question before the effects of the substance are known. See J. KELSEY, W.
THOMPSON & A. EVANS, MErHODS IN OBSERVATIONAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 8-9 (1986) (discussion of
different research techniques in epidemiology, all of which are ultimately retrospective).
3. Selikoff and his colleagues adduced a definitive quantitative assessment of the risk of con-
tracting asbestosis following exposure to asbestos in their seminal 1965 study. Selikoff, Churg &
Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis Among Industrial Insulation Workers, 132 ANNALS N. Y.
ACAD. SCI. 139 (1965). The authors examined 1,522 members of an insulation workers union in the
New York/New Jersey area and discovered that almost half of those examined exhibited signs of
pulmonary asbestosis. In the subgroup of workers employed over 40 years, abnormalities were de-
tected in over 90%.
4. By mid-1982, 11,000 health-related cases brought by 15,500 plaintiffs were pending against
Johns-Manville Corporation alone. Thereafter, suits were filed at a rate of about 425 cases per
month. W. Lundquist, Innovations in Mass Tort Litigation, Paper presented at the Meeting of the
American Association of Law & Science, Section on Torts (Jan. 23, 1984) (on file with author).
5. Toxic torts cases are generally defined as product liability suits which arise from exposure to
substances that pose a substantial risk of death or impairment either immediately or over a period of
time. These cases differ from more traditional strict liability cases: often more persons are exposed to
a product than actually buy it, which causes case management problems for determining and organiz-
ing plaintiffs and defendants; a longer lag time usually occurs between injury and exposure; and there
is greater need for expertise and scientific studies to prove a defect in toxic substances. McGovern,
Management of Multiparty Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law and Trends Affecting Case Manage-
ment, 19 FORUM 1 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980) (plaintiff daugh-
ters of mothers who took diethylstilbesterol (DES) brought suit against manufacturers of synthetic
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matory disease,7 toxic shock syndrome,' and Guillain-Barr6 Syndrome,9
the general population was exposed to known health hazards, but recovery
was granted only after a statistically significant number of deaths and in-
juries were incurred, allowing experts to quantify the hazard.10 This Note
discusses the inherent problems with a causation standard that requires
that the hazardous nature of a substance be quantified in the general pop-
ulation before granting recovery." Scientific quantification requires both
that an epidemiological study be conducted, a highly expensive and time-
consuming undertaking,12 and that the study be successful in distinguish-
ing injuries caused by the product from those induced by the general envi-
ronment.1" These scientific barriers not only ensure that very few sub-
estrogen products); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164 (1984) (same).
7. See, e.g., Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1985) (users of contraceptive
intrauterine device brought suit against manufacturer for contraction of pelvic inflammatory disease).
8. See, e.g., Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfr., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983) (survivors of woman
who died of toxic shock syndrome brought product liability action against manufacturer of tampons).
9. See, e.g., In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig. v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 567
(D. Colo. 1980) (plaintiff brought suit under Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries arising from Swine
Flu innoculation).
10. In each of these cases, the court demanded epidemiological evidence to satisfy the general
causation requirement. Evidence only that the substance was risky (e.g., carcinogenic), based on
animal and other non-human research, was inadequate.
11. Although there are many other serious problems inherent in toxic tort suits, such as case
management, see, e.g., Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases Under Rule 23(bXl), 96
HARV. L. REv. 1143 (1983), they are secondary to the overriding problem of scientific uncertainty
and the absence of conclusive facts for any satisfactory decision in favor of either plaintiff's recovery or
manufacturer's immunity. See also infra note 48 (distinguishing this Note's trans-scientific focus from
other trans-scientific issues). In fact, once courts acknowledge this scientific uncertainty, the increased
predictability of outcomes may make case management and financial planning easier.
The fundamental premise of this Note is that the legal system ignores hazards and other man-made
risks which have not yet been studied thoroughly or analyzed statistically. The high improbability that
the effects of an unsafe product will be quantified, in turn, considerably impedes deterrence. In con-
trast, Steve Gold, the author of Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of
Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986) [hereinafter Gold Note], indicates
that the primary problem in toxic tort cases is the misuse of statistical evidence that is already well-
established. This Note addresses toxic torts that are no longer trans-scientific, or are at least able to be
quantified as to the magnitude of the hazard or risk. See, e.g., id. at 380 ("Toxic tort litigation,
therefore, involves inferences on causation derived from group-based information [i.e., epidemiological
studies] . . ").
12. See, e.g., H. NORTHRUP, R. ROWAN & C. PERRY, THE IMPACT OF OSHA: A STUDY OF
THE EFFECTS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH Acr ON THREE KEY INDUS-
TRIES-AEROSPACE, CHEMICALS, AND TEXTILES 232 (1978). For example, epidemiological data is
available for only 14% of the more than 400 chemicals currently reviewed by the International Agency
for Research on Cancer. See Althouse, Huff, Tomatis & Wilbourn, An Evaluation of Chemicals and
Industrial Processes Associated with Cancer in Humans Based on Human and Animal Data: IARC
Monographs Volumes I to 20, 40 CANCER RES. 1, 1-2 (1980).
13. In most cases there is no unique set of symptoms for diseases resulting from exposure to
hazardous substances, and often the symptoms resemble those resulting from the natural aging process
or common diseases. See, e.g., J. KELsEY, W. THOMPSON & A. EVANS, supra note 2, at 12; Duce, In
Search of Adequate Compensation for Toxic Waste Injuries: Who and How To Sue, 12 PEPPERDINE
L. REV. 609, 620 (1985). Additionally, many diseases result from multifactorial etiology-several
factors interact together to produce harm. See, e.g., J. KELSEY, W. THOMPSON & A. EVANS, supra
note 2, at 16 (discussing "effect modification" occurring when magnitude of cause and disease varies
according to a third variable); Rodricks & Tardiff, Conceptual Basis for Risk Assessment, in ASSESS-
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stances will be studied adequately to meet existing legal requirements,14
but also make it difficult, or even impossible, for a manufacturer to pre-
dict liability in the interim period after animal experimentation indicates
that a substance is dangerous, but before the hazard is quantified on
humans. 5 In order to reincorporate deterrence into toxic tort cases"6 and
to provide a basis for determining liability in this scientifically uncertain
interim period, the standard for liability must be revised.17
This Note proposes a causation standard that circumvents problems
whose solutions are scientifically indeterminate by combining a qualitative
showing of causation with proof that the manufacturer acted negligently
in introducing an "abnormally dangerous" product. Qualitative evidence
of a causal link would include proof of substantial exposure to the sub-
stance and injury consistent with that substance, rather than the present
requirement that plaintiff prove with statistical certainty that causation
was "more probable than not."' Proof that the substance is "abnormally
dangerous" would involve a finding that a manufacturer acted negligently
in marketing a product when it "should have known" that the product
MENT AND MANAGEMENT OF CHEMICAL RISKS 3, 4 (J. Rodricks & R. Tardiff eds. 1984);
Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic Torts": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens
on the Chemical Victim, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 177, 199 (1983).
14. The FDA has set the "adequate level of research" for some chemicals through pretesting
regulations. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (1985) (regulations governing pretesting of drugs under
Food and Drug Act). However, only a small minority of chemicals presently in use have been subject
to these tests or have been studied even minimally. STEERING COMM. ON IDENTIFICATION OF Toxic
AND POTENTIALLY Toxic CHEM. FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE NAT'L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, ToxIcrTY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND
PRIORITIES 10-12 (1984).
15. Although Congress has supplemented tort liability with statutory and regulatory controls on
hazardous substances, these legislative remedies have proven largely ineffectual. First, statutory con-
trol of toxic substances is dispersed over a dozen statutes and regulated by five agencies. This piece-
meal regulation produces inconsistent and inefficient results. Second, the small budgets of these agen-
cies preclude effective regulation of a vast number of chemicals. Third, the regulatory agencies tend to
operate from a set of static rules which do not promote technological innovation or adapt to improve-
ments in research techniques. See Trauberman, supra note 13, at 203-05. Finally, many toxic sub-
stances simply fall between the statutory cracks and are not subject to direct regulation. See Furrow,
Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1983).
16. See, e.g., Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vi-
sion of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 855 (1984) ("Ifn contrast to sporadic accidents,
which generally result from all-too-human individual lapses of attention, mass exposure torts are
frequently products of the deliberate policies of businesses that tailor safety investments to profit mar-
gins. Such risk-taking policies should be especially amenable to control through threats of liability."
(footnotes omitted)).
17. In developing the strict product liability doctrine, courts have tended to place less emphasis on
determining the most equitable way to distribute losses among the parties, such as individualized
rights and basic principles of fault and punishment, and instead have sought to identify the most
expedient and efficient way to fulfill broader principles of societal well-being. This Note argues that
the principles of strict products liability, which consider only proof that the product was defective and
caused the injury, must be modified, and fundamental tort goals of deterring negligent or wrongful
conduct should be given more prominence in determining liability in trans-scientific cases. See Hol-
lenshead, Historical Perspective on Product Liability Reform, 1 J. PROD. LIAB. 75, 81 (1982).
18. See infra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
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posed a serious risk, although still unquantified, to human health. The
jury would determine whether the manufacturer's marketing decision that
the benefits of the product outweighed the costs to human health was rea-
sonable.19 If a plaintiff satisfies both of these requirements-proof of a
qualitative causal link and the distribution of an "unreasonably danger-
ous" product-then the burden will shift to defendant to prove that the
product was safe, the hazards were not foreseeable, benefits outweighed
potential costs at the time of marketing, or that the plaintiff was not ex-
posed to substantial concentrations of the product.
I. THE PROBLEM IN Toxic TORTS: TRANS-SCIENCE
At the heart of the problem presently confronted by the courts in toxic
tort suits is the inability to determine causation quantitatively when trans-
scientific issues20 are involved-when questions asked of science, such as
the statistically significant effects of a chemical on human health, cannot
be answered at the time.21 For example, early quantification of the risk a
chemical poses to human health is impossible because ethical policies pre-
clude tests on a large number of humans.2 Instead, science is capable only
of indicating that a substance is generally dangerous through studies on
non-human subjects or accidental spills.2" Thus, for many types of inju-
19. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
20. Alvin Weinberg, a radiation specialist at Oak Ridge Laboratory, first developed the notion of
"trans-science":
The point missed . . . is that the seemingly simple question 'What is the effect on human
health of very low levels of physical insult?' can be stated in scientific terms; it can, so to
speak, be asked of science, yet it cannot be answered by science.I have. . .proposed the name
trans-scientific for such questions that seemingly are part of science yet in fact transcend sci-
ence. . . [Even] any null experiment-that is, an experiment that shows no biological effect at
low levels of insult-does not prove the insult is harmless, since a larger experiment might
show effects. . . . I must stress that where low-level effects are concerned, there will always
be a trans-scientific residue. To decide on standards when science can say neither yea nor nay
requires some procedure other than the one usually used by scientists in resolving bona fide
scientific questions.
Letters to the Editor, 174 SCIENCE 546-47 (1971) (letter from Alvin Weinberg); see also Weinberg,
Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972).
21. In this crystal ball question, the tools which would be necessary for an accurate prediction
would include the ability to test hazardous substances on a large number of human subjects in care-
fully controlled circumstances over a long period of time. In the case of the effects of Agent Orange,
for example, the definitive study would examine the effects of the herbicide on large populations at
various low concentrations over a period of twenty to fifty years. In addition, an epidemiologist would
have to isolate control populations identical to the exposed populations to eliminate the effects of all
other variables. Resulting statistics might indicate correlations between exposure to Agent Orange and
resultant injuries.
22. See C. FRIED, MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION: PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1974); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, EXPERIMENTS AND RESEARCH WITH HUMANS: VALUES
IN CONFLICT (1975); R. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (1981);
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOR EVALUATING THE ToxIcITY OF
CHEMICALS, PART I 41-43 (1978).
23. See W. RowE, EVALUATION METHODS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 26-29 (1983)
(discussing limited data bases for determining effects of toxic substances on human health). Most
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ries, several decades may pass before harm manifests following low, but
continuous exposure to the hazardous substance.24 In the following sec-
tion, trans-science will be defined and its impact on the judicial system
examined. Section II will investigate the legal bases for the present inade-
quacy of the courts to adjudicate trans-scientific issues. Section III will
outline a proposal for reform that attempts to mold the judicial system to
adapt to the unique characteristics of trans-science.
A. The Source of the Problem
Unlike the traditional scientific process in which hypotheses are con-
stantly refined by experiment and observation,25 the process involved in
trans-science is frozen at an early developmental stage, consisting of a
experts agree that tests on animals, short-term tests on microorganisms, and chemical structure analy-
ses generally provide the best, if not the only, available information about the tendency of a substance
to cause chronic health impairments in humans. See WORK GROUP ON RISK ASSESSMENT, INTER-
AGENCY REGULATORY LIAISON GROUP (IRLG), SCIENTIFIC BASES FOR IDENTIFICATION OF PO-
TENTIAL CARCINOGENS AND ESTIMATION OF RISKS, 44 Fed. Reg. 39,858, 39,862-71 (1979) [herein-
after IRLG WORK GROUP]; Gralla, Protocol Preparation: Design and Objectives, in SCIENTIFIC
CONSIDERATIONS IN MONITORING AND EVALUATING TOxICOLOGICAL RESEARCH 1, 2 (E. Gralla
ed. 1981) (Determination of toxicity of chemical on humans has "its genesis [in] the hands of a
technician in the animal room of a toxicology laboratory, where the animal and chemical first come
together."); 2 G. VE-rroitAzzi, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL FOOD REGULATORY TOxICOLoGY:
PROFILES 1 (1981) ("The possibility of causing long-term toxic effects by the use of food additives
(food colors, antimicrobials, antioxidants, etc.) has alerted toxicologists to require extensive and strict
animal testing prior to utilization of these substances in food, in order to protect the health of the
consumer."); W6RLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 22, at 74 ("Evaluation of the toxicity of
chemicals in aninmal models of commonly occurring human diseases [is particularly valuable] . . . in
evaluat[ing] experimentally the interactions between exposure to toxic chemicals and model disease
conditions.").
24. It often takes five to forty years for a disease to appear after continuous, low dose exposure to
a hazardous substance. During this time, the victim may be exposed to other variables which may
cause a similar disease or symptoms. See J. KELSEY, W. THOMPSON & A. EVANS, supra note 2, at
14-16 (discussing separation of indirect causes from direct causes of disease in epidemiology studies);
Hall & Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr. Dore, 7 HARV. ENVTL L. REV.
441 (1983); see also Rodricks & Tardiff, supra note 13, at 3, 4. Additionally, records of exposure
may be lost in intervening years, which further complicates attempts to correlate exposure with on-
slaught of a disease.
25. Broadly speaking, competing social science theories involve adequate factual bases for judicial
comparison and evaluation. Nevertheless, discontinuities between law and trans-science reemerge over
such issues as insanity or addiction, where physiological or medical explanations are incomplete or
frozen in hypothetical stages. For example,
Debate rages within the medical profession as to whether 'alcoholism' is a separate 'disease' in
any meaningful biochemical, physiological or psychological sense, or whether it represents one
peculiar manifestation in some individuals of underlying psychiatric disorders.
It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alcohol his hands will begin to shake, he
will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he will have hallucinations; it is quite another to say
that a man has a 'compulsion' to take a drink, but that he also retains a certain amount of 'free
will' with which to resist. It is simply impossible, in the present state of our knowledge, to
ascribe a useful meaning to the latter statement.
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 522, 526 (1968). While acknowledging these more general complexi-
ties of law and trans-science, this Note focuses on the problem in toxic tort cases of science's inability
to quantify the effects of a substance on human health.
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number of competing hypotheses which have never been tested or are
tested only superficially and unsystematically.2 The "trans-scientist"
must rely largely on short-term controlled experiments conducted on labo-
ratory animals or isolated accidents to predict the potential risks of expo-
sure in the multi-variable outside environment. Accordingly, the realm of
trans-science is characterized by an extrapolatory gap27 which separates
the experimentally established effects of a substance on non-humans or on
humans following isolated, short-term disasters from the untested predic-
tions of the effects on humans following exposure to low doses over a long
period of time.
In the past, trans-science did not appear to pose a problem for courts,
because most personal injury suits involving the effects of hazardous sub-
stances on human health were filed several decades after the substance
had been released into the environment. By that time data had emerged to
demonstrate with statistical certainty the magnitude of impact that the
substance had on humans, and thus the probability that it caused plain-
tiff's injury.2 8 The most significant trans-scientific issues, therefore, were
resolved before the issue ever entered the court room. In contrast, many
recent toxic tort claims have been filed while the effects of the substance
26. The degree to which an issue is trans-scientific does vary, however. First, not all substances
considered in toxic torts cases are equally trans-scientific, and some are not trans-scientific in any
way. The molecular structure of a chemical or the existing literature documenting a chemical's impact
on health determine, to some extent, the level of certainty regarding that substance's effect on humans.
Second, whether an issue is more or less trans-scientific depends on the nature of the injury inflicted.
Substances that inflict diseases which are not specific to that particular chemical but instead have a
high probability of natural occurrence are more trans-scientific than substances which inflict specific
diseases. Asbestos and DES injuries are unusual and specific to these particular substances, thus proof
of mesothelioma or adenocarcinoma, coupled with evidence of exposure to the substance, indicates an
almost undeniable link. Most other substances, however, such as Agent Orange, radiation, indoor air
pollutants, and hazardous wastes, inflict injuries which are common in the everyday world and there-
fore difficult to trace to any specific cause. Finally, the substantial lag time before any injury becomes
apparent-typically several decades-adds still another trans-scientific component. In addition to the
legal problems that statutes of limitations present, often the evidence, data, and other records regard-
ing the duration or extent of exposure necessary to establish a causal relation are lost.
27. The seriousness of the extrapolatory gap depends on the strength of the assumptions, for
example, selection of the proper margin of safety for extrapolating from animal studies to humans. See
Wodicka, Use of Risk Assessment and Safety Evaluation, in ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF
CHEMICAL RISKS 138-44 (J. Rodricks & R. Tardiff eds. 1984). Choice of the multipliers used in
extrapolating from animals to humans can vary considerably within broadly defined bounds, and the
resulting choice has a profound effect on the ultimate level of safety achieved. See, e.g., Salsburg,
Statistics and Toxicology: An Overview, in SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS IN MONITORING AND
EVALUATING TOXICOLOGICAL RESEARCH 123, 131 (E. Gralla ed. 1981).
28. See, e.g., Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984) (husband com-
menced action against tampon manufacturer for death of wife resulting from toxic shock syndrome);
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083-84 (5th Cir. 1973) (action against
asbestos manufacturer for asbestosis); Lima v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1981)
(plaintiff brought suit to recover for injuries allegedly resulting from Swine Flu innoculation); see also
Black & Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 773-75
(1984) (tracing Swine Flu case law with relevant epidemiology studies). But cf. Gold Note, supra
note 11 (questioning inference from impact on general group to harm to individual plaintiff).
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are still clouded by the uncertainties of trans-science-before a statistically
significant number of persons have been exposed and a conclusive epide-
miological study has been done.2"
B. Impact of Trans-Science on the Judicial System
When determination of the effects of a substance on human health is in
this interim, trans-scientific stage, the probability that the substance might
be the cause of a disease is unclear. Satisfaction of the traditional "more
probable than not" standard becomes impossible, because plaintiffs cannot
prove that the substance had at least a fifty percent probability of being
responsible for their injuries. Courts generally deny recovery to these
plaintiffs and occasionally even refuse to hear their cases.30 On the other
hand, once epidemiological studies are completed and the data indicates
that the substance has a statistically significant effect on exposed persons,
the problems of trans-science diminish and courts grant recovery in almost
every plausible instance. 1
The deterrence achieved by suits which eventually do succeed is clouded
considerably by the sequence of events which must occur before the more
significant trans-scientific elements are resolved. The uncertainty sur-
rounding the extent of harm a substance will cause humans,32 the chance
that adequate records of exposure will be available,3 3 the probability that
an epidemiology study will be done," and the probability that it will be
successful,35 together reduce the likelihood that a negligent manufacturer
will be found liable. The limits of the scientific process as well as finite
resources to study every potential health hazard in a statistically compre-
29. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(Vietnam veterans not participating in class action brought suit against manufacturer of Agent Or-
ange for injuries resulting from spraying); In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp.
740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (class of veterans brought suit against manufacturer of herbicide Agent Orange
for injuries allegedly resulting from spraying of Agent Orange in Vietnam); Johnston v. United
States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984) (four employees of aircraft instrument plant brought suit
against government for cancers allegedly resulting from exposure to radiation in luminous dials); Al-
len v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984) (twenty-four plaintiffs brought suit against
government to recover for cancers allegedly resulting from testing of atomic weapons).
30. See infra notes 49-50, 66-68 and accompanying text.
31. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
33. See Schroeder & Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Regula-
tion, and Information, 72 GEo. L.J. 1231, 1234 (1984) (difficulties in studying occupational diseases
after workers have left workplace or become unavailable); Trauberman, supra note 13, at 200 ("If a
disease expresses itself long after exposure to a chemical, evidence as to its source and exposure path-
ways may be lost and the memories of witnesses may fade.").
34. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
35. Exposures that present only a low to moderate risk may not be identified because the number
of persons required for a statistically signficant sample size must be very large. For a discussion of the
methods used in calculating the necessary sample size, see J. KFLsY, W. THOMPSON & A. EVANS,
supra note 2, at 277-78.
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hensive way ensure that many hazards will remain undetected and their
manufacturers undeterred. Moreover, even when the effects of a substance
are detected, compensation may be frustrated by the manufacturer's or
insurer's bankruptcy. 6
The case of Parker v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company
of Wisconsin37 presents an excellent example of this clouded deterrence,
where the uncertainties of scientific detection impede a full assessment of
liability. Plaintiff Parker worked as a material handler and production
operator, assembling and disassembling nuclear weapons. During his four
and one-half years of employment, plaintiff was exposed daily to moderate
doses of radiation. Although radiation was determined to be highly carci-
nogenic to animals as early as 1950, there were no conclusive investiga-
tions regarding the effects of low dosages on humans. In 1965, plaintiff
was afflicted with cancer of the lymph node and sued the allegedly negli-
gent employer. The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the trial court's
judgment for defendant, however. In its holding the court stated that, re-
gardless of what isolated radiation studies might demonstrate, in the ab-
sence of a quantitative probability that radiation will cause'cancer in
humans there was no evidence indicating causation. The judge ignored the
fact that he was not ruling on the weight of existing evidence, but rather
on the limits of science.38
Analyzing the troubling verdicts in the many cases like Parker, scholars
have focused on the scientific difficulty of determining recovery when sev-
eral possible causes of an injury exist.39 To resolve the problem they sug-
gest a proportional liability scheme that calculates damages according to
the probability that the injury was caused by the defective product.40 Such
an analysis, however, assumes that the risks can be quantified. It com-
pletely overlooks the more onerous, first-order problem confronting courts
36. See Epstein, The Legal and Insurance Dynamics of Mass Tort Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 475, 495-505 (1984) (discussing problems of insurance coverage in mass tort cases); Note, The
Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Proceedings, 96 HARV. L. REv.
1121 (1983).
37. 440 S.W.2d 43 (Tex. 1969).
38. The court did note: "This requirement does in some instances place extraordinary burdens of
proof on claimants. But once the theory of causation leaves the realm of lay knowledge for esoteric
scientific theories, the scientific theory must be more than a possibility to the scientists who created
it." Id. at 49.
39. For example, Rosenberg, supra note 16, observed:
Mass exposure cases present two distinct varieties of specific-causation questions. First, it is
often unclear which one of several manufacturers of a given toxic agent produced the particu-
lar unit of the substance that harmed the plaintiff. Second, and far more common, is the
problem of determining the origin of the victim's disease.
Id. at 856 (footnote omitted); see also Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 28, at 750 (discussing use of
epidemiology to determine probable cause).
40. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 859 (proportional liability in relation to the probability
of causation).
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which arises when science is unable to offer any numerical probability of
injury upon exposure to a hazardous substance. Thus, while the problem
of sorting out the potential causes of an injury is serious, this Note exam-
ines the more pervasive problem of how courts should handle substantial,
yet unquantifiable, risks.41
II. LEGAL BASES FOR FAILURE OF THE TORT SYSTEM WHEN
CONFRONTED WITH TRANS-SCIENTIFIC ISSUES
There are two major discontinuities between trans-science and the pre-
sent tort system.42 First, the statistical requirements for a "more probable
than not" standard of causation demand a certainty in quantifying causa-
tion which trans-science is incapable of producing. Second, the rules of
evidence and procedure are incompatible with the capabilities of trans-
science.
A. Causation Standards Are Incompatible with the Capabilities of
Trans-Science
The standard for proof of causation in toxic tort cases requires that the
occurrence be large enough to make it "more probable than not"43 that an
individual plaintiff's injury resulted from a hazard produced by defendant.
This involves two types of scientific proof: 1) epidemiology studies 4 indi-
41. The fact that this Note identifies the pervasive problem in toxic torts to be the treatment of
cases in which no epidemiology studies have been done and that involve risks which are largely un-
quantified does not lead to the conclusion that a case will be easily resolved once the risks are quanti-
fied to some extent or after one epidemiology study has been completed. See Gold Note, supra note
11, at n.12. Multiple trans-scientific problems will remain after the risks are quantified. However,
this Note asserts that these problems pale in comparison with the difficulties encountered in cases
where there is no experimental data quantifying the risk, and thus the fundamental issue in dispute,
the effects of a substance on human health, cannot be determined.
42. More specific impacts on the judicial system are tailored to the amount of trans-science con-
nected with a particular issue. Relevant considerations include: (1) indeterminate/determinate plain-
tiffs; (2) indeterminate/determinate defendants; (3) nature of the substance; (4) nature of the expo-
sure; (5) environment of exposure and other influences; and (6) nature of the impact. See McGovern,
supra note 5, at 3.
43. General standards for "more probable than not" include a showing of: "(1) exposure signifi-
cant enough to trigger disease; (2) a demonstrated, biologically plausible relationship between the
chemical and disease; (3) the diagnosis of such disease in the plaintiff; and (4) expert opinion that the
plaintiff's disease was was [sic] consistent with exposure to the chemical." Hall & Silbergeld, supra
note 24, at 445.
44. More lenient courts settle for satisfaction of this first requirement only-epidemiology studies
that demonstrate twice the normal risk of disease following exposure to a substance. This "weak
causation standard" has been widely criticized, however. By requiring defendants to pay full compen-
sation not only to their actual victims, but to all victims inflicted with a specific disease which has a
high probability of being caused by defendant, the weak version of the preponderance rule imposes
excessive liability. This occurs because applying the rule for causation exceeding fifty percent disre-
gards the responsibility of disease victims and other social factors for losses and costs attributable to
background risks. In addition, the super-deterrent effect operates indiscriminately, without regard to
the culpability of defendants. Rosenberg, supra note 16, at 881.
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cating that the risk that a hazard will cause a specific injury is at least
twice the normal, background level of risk for that injury,'5 and 2) medi-
cal proof which links defendant's hazard with each plaintiff's injuries."'
Satisfaction of these requirements is generally sufficient to shift the bur-
den to defendant, even if plaintiff's claim did not preclude all other
causes.
4 7
In cases involving trans-science, resolution of the first element is often
decisive.'8 While experimentation on animals and other organisms may
indicate a plausible relationship between exposure to a substance and re-
sulting injury, the courts' further quantitative requirement that the occur-
rence of the disease in those exposed to a substance be twice the back-
ground incidence creates an insurmountable obstacle in trans-scientific
cases. This mandate essentially requires direct experimentation on
humans, with a sample size large enough to yield statistically significant
results. Consequently, when courts impose "more probable than not" or
"but for" causation standards on trans-scientific issues failure is inevita-
ble, because strong probabalistic evidence for causality is being demanded
from scientists who are unable to conduct the necessary experiments.
45. The "more probable than not" standard in effect requires proof that the existence of the
contested act is more probable than its nonexistence. Thus, if the normal occurrence of the injury is
(y), defendant must create a condition where at least (y) additional injuries occur. The total number
of injuries is then the normal occurrence (y) plus defendant's added risk (y) = 2(y) total injuries.
The rule has been accepted largely without question, perhaps because of its mathematical reasona-
bleness. See M. FINYLESTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 66 (1978). In fact, most analyses
of the rule consider its ability to minimize errors: For example, if the decision probability for causa-
tion is lowered to 45% in favor of the plaintiff (e.g., plaintiff must prove 45% probability that defend-
ant caused injury), this will increase the risk of error of unnecessarily punishing defendant by 5%.
The same reasoning applies, to the benefit of defendant, if the decision probability for causation is
raised to 55%. See id. at 66-67.
For a causation probability of less than 50%, however, the rule has the ultimate effect of completely
foreclosing any imposition of liability and thus denies victims any recovery. This makes an unwanted
statement that certain risks (up to two times the risk posed by natural, background conditions-which
is quite considerable) are acceptable, and that losses associated with these risks should be borne en-
tirely by victims.
46. An even stronger version of this causation standard was employed in Johnston v. United
States, 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984), where the court required proof of causation to a medical
certainty. See infra text accompanying notes 49-50.
47. See, e.g., American Life Ins. v. Moore, 216 Ark. 44, 223 S.W.2d 1019 (1949) (jury award of
death benefits under employee group accident policy affirmed even though medical experts admitted
fatal pulmonary embolism might not have been caused by previous work-related injury); Smith v.
Humboldt Dye Works, Inc., 34 A.D.2d 1041, 312 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1970) (affirming Workmen's Com-
pensation Board's award of benefits to employee engaged in dying wool yarns, even though medical
experts could not definitively link employee's bladder cancer to exposure to aniline dyes).
48. The determination of specific injury causation also creates trans-scientific problems, however.
For example, in tobacco litigation, determining whether cigarettes cause the emphysema in a particu-
lar plaintiff may involve medical speculation not common in other diagnoses. See, e.g., Snider, Per-
spective on Emphysema, in 4 CLINICS IN CHEST MEDICINE SYMPOSIUM ON EMPHYSEMA 329, 331
(G. Snider ed. 1983) ("The problems of precise diagnosis and of accurate clinical/pathologic correla-
tions are longstanding."). Although trans-scientific controversy may preclude recovery, the ambiguity
occurs at the individual level, according to the unique strengths and weaknesses of each plaintiff's case
and is thus not as momentus in scope as the trans-scientific problems posed by general causation.
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The case of Johnston v. United States illustrates this anomalous re-
sult." In Johnston plaintiffs alleged that their cancers were a result of
daily occupational exposure to minute amounts of ionizing radiation. In
denying plaintiffs recovery, the court refused to interpret the Kansas cau-
sation standard requiring proof to meet a "reasonable degree of medical
certainty" as only meaning that the bulk of scientifically available data
support plaintiffs. Instead, the court held that the specification necessi-
tated "medical certainty" that plaintiffs' exposure to radiation was the
cause of their resulting cancer-an imperative well beyond the capability
of contemporary science. The court's words are revealing: "We can see
that in matters of determining the cancer risk from low occupational doses
of radiation, scientists do not deal with what exists in fact and can be
measured or experimentally proven. . . .Cause in tort law needs to be
founded on more than a theory or hypothesis. '50
Several judges have recognized that the traditional causation require-
ments are incompatible with trans-science and have responded by apply-
ing a weaker, qualitative standard.5 Because most courts have adhered to
some form of "more probable than not," however, an inconsistency be-
tween courts has ensued, further eroding any predictable basis for
liability.
B. Traditional Judicial Constraints Are Incompatible with Trans-
Science
A second problem emerges when court§ are forced to evaluate and in-
terpret trans-scientific issues under existing evidentiary and procedural
rules.52
49. 597 F. Supp. 374 (D. Kan. 1984).
50. Id. at 425. Although a slightly weaker burden of proof was required to establish causation in
In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), the result was
the same. Plaintiffs were asked to produce epidemiological studies which could not be obtained, due
primarily to inadequate records of exposure, in order to quantify the probability that plaintiffs' inju-
ries were caused by the herbicide: "No acceptable study to date of Vietnam veterans and their fami-
lies concludes that there is a causal connection ...." (emphasis added).
51. See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah). The court stated:
Judges and lawyers must approach with great care, the idea that court decisions can be
justified solely on the findings of science, lest the quest for justice be lost along the way [quot-
ing Markey, Needed: A Judicial Welcome for Technology, 79 F.R.D. 209, 211 (19791.
In the pragmatic world of "fact" the court passes judgment on the probable. Dispute resolu-
tion demands rational decision, not perfect knowledge.
Id. at 260.
52. Constitutional requirements also appear to present obstacles to the adjudication of toxic tort
cases. In the recent case of Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 212 N.J. Super. 6, 512 A.2d 1142 (1986), the
court was forced to balance the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial against the overwhelming
complexity of the case which threatened the litigants' Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. See. e.g.,
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980). The court concluded that
since the action for injuries caused by a toxic waste landfill involved 106 resident plaintiffs and 625
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1. Evidentiary Standards of Admissibility
In the courts the adversarial process seeks to determine the truth from
various sets of facts collected by adverse parties. The Federal Rules of
Evidence were developed to distinguish necessary and relevant facts from
those that are unnecessary. Unfamiliar with the terminology and princi-
ples of science,53 judges are nevertheless forced to make subtle distinctions
between fact and nonfact, and between theories that are generally ac-
cepted within the scientific community and those that are controversial."
In cases involving trans-science, precisely these questions cannot be an-
swered by the scientific community itself.55 Without definitive data or ex-
periments, there is no generally accepted or reasonable scientific basis for
substantiating the finding of a causal connection, 8 and the use of indirect
various defendants and included cross claims, third party actions, multiple issues, and complicated
scientific concepts, defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial should be granted.
In order to demonstrate why this case will be too complicated and lengthy to be tried by a
jury consonant with due process of law, it now becomes necessary to discuss in some detail the
course that the trial will take. First, it will be necessary for plaintiffs to prove what toxic
substances stored by the landfills caused the injuries or property damage allegedly suffered by
plaintiffs. . . . Next, plaintiffs will have to prove which generator produced which toxic sub-
stance, and which hauler transported same to the landfill. Furthermore, each of 106 plaintiffs
must in order to establish proximate cause, prove that his or her particular injury or property
damage was caused by the substance in question.
In the toxic waste case now before the court, since trial by jury will not be able to produce a
fair and balanced result, the court feels impelled to protect the integrity of thejudicial process
by ordering that type of trial best designed to achieve justice, i.e., a trial by a judge without a
jury. Otherwise, the judge would not be presiding over a fair trial, but over a game of judicial
Russian roulette.
Kenney, 212 N.J. Super. at 19, 22, 512 A.2d at 1149, 1150.
53. See, e.g., T. KUHN, STRUCTURE OF ScIENrwrmc REVOLUTIONS 163-64 (1970) (discussing
esoteric nature of science).
54. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("[W]hile courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery,
the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.").
55. Because of the unverifiable nature of trans-science, then, the holding of the case often becomes
determined by the lawyers' persuasiveness in stressing the risks involved. Similarly, judges necessarily
acquire considerable discretion in interpreting facts. For example, in In re Agent Orange, 597 F.
Supp. at 749-50, Judge Weinstein remarked repeatedly on the extensive costs and courtroom time
that would be involved and indicated his preference for resolving the case in the most expedient
way-out of court; see also Peto, Distorting the Epidemiology of Cancer: The Need for a More Bal-
anced Overview, 284 NATURE 297, 297 (1980) ("The vacuum of reliable scientific knowledge is such
that each side can find scientists who will maintain in courts, in public hearings or in the scientific
literature whatever is politically convenient . . . [Slcientists on both sides of this debate now have
career interests at stake in it.").
56. In Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 374, 409-15 (D. Kan. 1984), for example, the
court rejected the testimony of two expert witnesses because they had no reliable or significant evi-
dence on which to premise their opinions; neither served on national committees chosen to address the
question under dispute; neither had accepted the consensus reports of the committees as reliable au-
thorities; and both used unreliable statistical methods not commonly used in that particular field of
science. The court's conclusion was abrupt: "Thus, when the doses are so low that the existence of
any effect at all is only hypothetical theory, such calculations are mere speculation. In the court's
view, these calculations should not, nor will they, be accepted here as valid evidence on causation." Id.
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extrapolations from animal studies may not be considered relevant to the
effects on humans.57 Thus, disputes over the admissibility of evidence
center on the scientific validity of vying hypotheses rather than on the
legal relation of relevant facts to facts that are irrelevant or have only
minimal probative value.
Judicial opinions illustrate the courts' wildly varying views on the "fac-
tual" value of trans-scientific hypotheses. In Lima v. United States5" the
court held expert testimony to be inadmissible under Rules 702 and 703
of the Federal Rules of Evidence because the "smoldering Guillain-Barre
Sydrome (GBS)" theory used to explain plaintiff's injury was not of the
type "reasonably relied on by experts in the field."59 Specifically, the
court noted that while the theory demonstrated the causal connection be-
tween exposure to the Swine Flu immunization shot and resulting injuries
consistent with that exposure, the factual basis to support the theory was
simply too incomplete-a consequence of the small data base, not of the
scientist's lack of credibility or methods of experimentation. Due to this
inadequate factual basis, the court refused to grant recovery. In several
other Swine Flu cases, however, courts have accepted the "smoldering
GBS" theory and have granted relief to plaintiffs with claims similar to
Lima's.eo
at 426. "A theory of hypothesis or assumption which yields a number like 97.6% or 8% is not yielding
a real number." Id. at 425.
In contrast, the court in Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfr., 724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983),
admitted government epidemiological studies on Toxic Shock Syndrome, in spite of Proctor and Gam-
ble's challenges that they were not "factual findings," not done by persons with first-hand knowledge
in the field, and untrustworthy. The court ruled against exclusion on several grounds: the procedures
were widely accepted in the field of epidemiology, the investigations were timely and objective, and the
individuals preparing them were especially skilled. "IT]here is no reason not to admit the findings
simply because they tend towards the conclusory rather than the factual end, unless . . . the sources
of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness." Id. at 618 (citing United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 498 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.D.C. 1980)).
57. See Faulk, Strategic and Scientific Considerations in Toxic Tort Defense, 26 S. TEx. L.J.
513, 535-36 (1985) (use of animal studies "creates unique opportunities for defense counsel to chal-
lenge the admissibility of this progressive proof. If the plaintiff attempts to rely upon novel theories
which have not been generally accepted by the scientific community, such evidence may be legally
unreliable and, hence, inadmissible").
58. 508 F. Supp. 897 (D. Colo. 1981).
59. The court in Beighler v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1980), gave insight into the tradi-
tional application of these Federal Rules of Evidence:
Rules 702 and 704 allow properly qualified experts to testify in the form of an opinion about
issues as to which their expertise may assist the trier of fact, even if the opinion embraces an
ultimate issue of fact. Rule 703 permits the expert to base opinions or inferences on facts or
data not admissible in evidence if they are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
field. Rule 705 permits an expert to give opinion testimony without prior disclosure of the
underlying facts or data.
Id. at 533.
60. See, e.g., Barnes v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 1065 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (government held
liable under "smoldering GBS" theory even though acute GBS did not develop until many months
after inoculation); see also Spencer v. United States, 569 F. Supp. 325, 329 n.2 (W.D. Miss. 1983)
(citing relevant cases).
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Likewise, in In re Agent Orange,61 Judge Weinstein employed the
Federal Rules of Evidence to remove much of the science which he consid-
ered either "irrelevant" or "conclusory." While one of plaintiffs' experts
withstood a motion challenging his credibility, the court held his theories
to be inadmissible under Rule 403. Although the court did note that the
evidence might mislead "at least some members of the jury," the court
based its holding more solidly on the desire to put "this prolonged litiga-
tion" to an end.12 "In complex and protracted litigation, waste of the
trier's time is a particularly telling factor."'63
2. Rules of Procedure
The Federal Rules of Procedure raise even more onerous difficulties in
the evaluation of trans-scientific issues. It is the general rule that sum-
mary judgment, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and judgment on
the pleadings are granted only when there is no material issue of fact in
dispute.6 ' When confronted with disputes over interpretation of uncer-
tainty, courts are generally reluctant to grant summary judgment, limiting
its use to situations in which the facts are based on mere pro forma deni-
als, sham, or patently false assertions in the pleadings.6" These patterns
61. 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
62. Id. at 1256.
63. Id. at 1256. Judge Weinstein, although properly aware of limited judicial resources, neglected
to pay equal heed to the fundamental purpose of the judicial system-the preservation of justice.
64. "An issue of fact is deemed to be material if the outcome of the case might be altered by its
resolution one way rather than another. A material issue of fact may be framed by an express conflict
on a particular point between the parties' respective pleadings." 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1368 (1969).
65. Although not a universal trend, there has been a strong tendency for judges to defer to juries
on the issue of causation in toxic tort cases rather than to grant summary judgment. For example, in
Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (wrongful death action against
manufacturer for pulmonary fibrosis resulting from long-term skin exposure to paraquat), the court
found that
[i]n a courtroom, the test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is not
scientific certainty but legal sufficiency; if reasonable jurors could conclude from the expert
testimony that paraquat more likely than not caused Ferebee's injury, the fact that another
jury might reach the opposite conclusion or that science would require more evidence before
conclusively considering the causation question resolved is irrelevant.
[When t]he dose-response relationship . . . is one of the most sharply contested questions
currently being debated in the medical community . . . surely it would be rash for a court to
declare as a matter of law that, below a certain threshold level of exposure, dermal absorption
of paraquat has no detrimental effect.
Id. at 1536. Similarly, in Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984), the court
stressed the importance of a jury determination of causation and criticized those cases which leave it to
the
judge's subjective ability to 'count heads' among experts in the scientific community. Critics
and courts ... have argued that the acceptability of scientific data should be debated by
experts before the jury.
The weight that a juror might ascribe to the data, of course, would turn on the credibility of
and persuasiveness of the experts that each side offered to explain the data.
Id. at 304.
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are not followed uniformly in the toxic tort area, however."6 Judge Wein-
stein's ruling that animal studies and over one hundred privately con-
ducted epidemiological studies were inadmissible 67 heavily influenced the
court's determination that there were no facts in dispute in granting de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, because most of plaintiffs' re-
maining evidence relied, at least in part, on extrapolations from these ex-
cluded studies.6"
In sum, under our present system judges are called on to make scientifi-
cally delicate determinations of what is resolvable, certain, or factual in
order to quantify causation under legal rules designed for more determi-
nable situations. If lines must be drawn, they will be drawn by judges
who often ignore the inherently limited capabilities of scientific research,
leading inevitably to inconsistent and haphazard judgments. Such incon-
sistency, in turn, precludes adequate financial planning for liability by
manufacturers when initially marketing the product and ultimately im-
pairs the ability of the courts to deter wrongful conduct. Instead of provid-
ing a predictable basis for imposing liability, manufacturers will conclude
that liability is based on each judge's personal perception of "fact" and
"relevancy."
III. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
In order to provide proper incentives for deterring wrongful behavior
and to ensure equitable compensation to injured victims in toxic tort cases,
a standard for liability must be devised which can be applied consistently
66. See, e.g., Stiles v. Union Carbide Corp., 520 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (summary judg-
ment granted to defendants in wrongful death resulting from exposure to toxic chemicals because
evidence of defendant's concealment of hazardous nature of chemicals was insufficient to toll statute of
limitations); Synalloy Corp. v. Newton, 254 Ga. 174, 326 S.E.2d 470 (1985) (employees brought suit
against employer for negligent exposure to carcinogenic betanapthylamine; court granted summary
judgment to defendant employer because disabilities had not yet manifested and Georgia statute of
limitations barred employee claims one year following exposure).
67. "A number of sound [governmentally conducted] epidemiological studies have been conducted
on the health effects of exposure to Agent Orange. These are the only useful studies having any
bearing on causation. All the other data supplied by the parties rests on surmise and inapposite ex-
trapolations from animal studies and industrial accidents." In re Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1231.
Weinstein did not support his decision to exclude all epidemiology studies not conducted by the gov-
ernment except by asserting that some of the studies relied on inapposite data or were flawed. Id. at
1241. The exclusion of all animal studies was based on the fact that the concentrations used in the
animal studies were higher than those in the environment and because the animal studies "involve
different biological species." Id. Judge Weinstein ignored the fact that extrapolation from animal
studies is a widely utilized scientific method. See supra note 23.
68. 611 F. Supp. at 1259-60. Judge Weinstein's unsupported and seemingly harsh ruling con-
trasts with traditional features of conclusory allegations: unsupported evidence (no connection between
fact and allegations); incomplete evidence; contradiction of known facts that both parties agree on; and
internally inconsistent claims. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Rendezvous, Inc., 699 F.2d 676, 678 (4th Cir.
1983) (expert hypotheses regarding sinking of vessel excluded because flatly inconsistent with uncon-
troverted facts); Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (expert
opinion excluded because economic theory wholly unsupported by facts of case).
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and clearly. The standard must adjust to the inability of trans-science to
quantify the effects of a substance. It.must also resolve or circumvent the
evidentiary and procedural problems resulting from the inherently hypo-
thetical, rather than factual, nature of trans-science. The reform proposed
by this Note would shift the burden of proof to the defendant following 1)
proof of qualitative causation and 2) proof that the product was "abnor-
mally dangerous."6 9 Together, these requirements should ensure that
plaintiffs will have their cases heard, while the manufacturers will have a
consistent basis for predicting future liability.70
A. Qualitative Causation
Under the present "more probable than not" causation requirements,
plaintiffs in toxic tort cases are unable to sustain their burden of proof
because the resulting injuries have not been statistically detected by epide-
miologists. The procedural burden of proof, however, should be refocussed
on the underlying realities of the typical toxic tort case. Plaintiffs injured
by hazardous products must have the power to be heard, despite the fact
that the statistical impact of the hazard has not yet been determined. The
revised causation standard should be based, then, on more qualitative ele-
ments of causation,7 1 such as proof that the plaintiff was exposed to sub-
69. Although Gold Note, supra note 11, does not address the toxic tort cases in which statistical
evidence is not yet available, his proposal resembles this Note's advice for reform. First, Gold indicates
that fault and negligence may become important factors in the determination of liability, even though
he chooses not to include them explicitly in his standard. Second, Gold suggests a burden of proof/
burden of persuasion standard which abandons the present single, numerical "more probable than
not" approach and incorporates more qualitative judgments, such as a "substantial factor" test. Thus,
Gold too selects a qualitative causation standard over a quantitative one. Application of Gold's "sub-
stantial factor" test to cases which are highly trans-scientific, however, may still require courts ulti-
mately to select a winning (or "substantially" convincing) hypothesis. In contrast, the qualitative cau-
sation standard set forth in this Note seeks to avoid scientific hypothesizing by judges and juries by
encouraging the production of more scientifically established criteria for determination of causation,
including proof of exposure to a hazardous substance and proof of an injury consistent with such
exposure.
70. Reincorporating notions of negligence while simultaneously weakening the necessary proof of
causation may cause earlier imposition of liability-before the risk is tested on humans-to the disad-
vantage of manufacturers, But, many manufacturers may prefer a more predictable basis for risk,
perhaps even at the cost of imposing liability earlier. Additionally, since manufacturers often are both
in more informed positions and are imposing their products on involuntary, non-purchasing plaintiffs,
there is potentially less cost in attaching greater burdens on defendant manufacturers. Finally, fairness
demands that a risk of error falling on plaintiffs should be partially shifted to defendants because, at
present, a substantial number of deaths are necessary before liability is imposed.
71. In fact, the Restatement (Second) of Torts mentions causation, but does not specifically inter-
ject proximate cause requirements into the strict products liability doctrine.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of
selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought
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stantial concentrations of the substance and was afflicted with an injury
consistent with the known hazards of that substance. In fact, this qualita-
tive causation standard, standing alone, was used to shift the burden of
proof to defendants in Allen"7 and has been suggested in Congress as a
statutory reform.73
This qualitative standard, unlike its present quantitative counterpart, 4
utilizes all available information regarding the hazardous substance, as
well as extrapolatory techniques, to determine potential effects on
humans. The difficulty of resolving trans-scientific problems is also eased
by a requirement that plaintiffs need only prove that a substance is capa-
ble of causing an injury consistent with their injury. This burden may be
satisfied by a thorough search of studies on the effects of the substance on
animals" or on humans in occupational settings and following disasters."
the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).
72. 588 F. Supp. at 428. Allen involved the effects of atomic radiation on human health, a trans-
scientific issue similar to Agent Orange in which the relevant epidemiological studies are not complete.
In Allen the court shifted the burden of proof upon a showing that ionizing radiation was hazardous
(based on animal studies and reports of human injuries resulting from occupational exposures and
industrial accidents); that plaintiff was exposed to substantial concentrations of the radiation; and that
plaintiff's injury was consistent with such radiation. In setting forth the rationale for this burden
shifting, the court stated:
This shift in burden of proof reflects a sound application of important legal policies to the
practical problems of trying a lawsuit: where a strong factual connection exists between de-
fendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, but selection of "actual" cause-in-fact from among
several "causes" is problematical, those difficulties of proof are shifted to the tortfeasor, the
wrongdoer, in order to do substantial justice between the parties.
Id. at 411.
73. Several bills introduced in Congress in 1979 and 1980 proposed similar qualitative causation
standards: 1) Claimant must have been exposed to a hazardous substance released by the defendant;
2) Exposure must be in sufficient concentration and of sufficient duration to create a "reasonable
likelihood" that it caused or contributed to the claimant's injury; and 3) There must be a "reasonable
likelihood" that exposure to the substance causes or contributes to the type of injury sustained by the
claimant. S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1980); see also H.R. 1049, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§
101-106 (1979); H.R. 3797, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3211-3215 (1979); H.R. 5291, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. §§ 211-215 (1979). In contrast to the reform set forth in this Note, however, these legislative
proposals specify that negligence or some showing of fault are not necessary for compensation.
Although these bills were not passed into law, a Senate Committee did undertake a formal study of
the problems unique to toxic torts and made recommendations for a compensation scheme which were
similar to those set out in the Senate bill. Under this proposal, proof of causation is shifted to defen-
dant once proof is adduced showing that claimant was exposed to a hazardous substance and suffered
injury that is known to result from such exposure. S. REP. No. 12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1982).
74. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
75. For example, human and animal responses are qualitatively similar with respect to all human
carcinogens, except arsenic. See, e.g., IRLG WORK GROUP, supra note 23, at 39,875; Karstadt, Pro-
tecting Public Health from Hazardous Substances: Federal Regulation of Environmental Contami-
nants, 5 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 50,165, 50,168 (1975). For a discussion of methods of
extrapolating from animal studies, see V. BROWN, ACUTE ToxscrrY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1980); E. CALABRESE, PRINCIPLES OF ANIMAL EXTRAPOLATION (1983); W. RoWE, supra note 23,
at 31-32; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 22, at 35-41; Salsburg, supra note 27, at
126-36.
76. See, e.g., J. CAIRNS, CANCER: SCIENCE AND SociEry 53-57 (1978); Reggiani, Anatomy of a
TCDD Spill: The Seveso Accident, in 2 HAZARD ASSESSMENT OF CHEMICALS 295-324 (J. Saxena
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Focusing litigation on the qualitative, resolvable aspects of causation
also avoids the evidentiary problems presented by trans-science. Under the
present "more probable than not" standard, admissibility is dependent
upon 1) whether each court wishes to view unverified hypotheses of a
substance's effect on humans as accepted as reasonable within the scien-
tific community, and 2) whether extrapolations from the effects of a sub-
stance on animals are relevant to humans. Under the proposed qualitative
standard, however, evidentiary questions will involve more commonplace
disputes over the facts related to exposure and to diagnosis of injuries in
plaintiff that are consistent with the known hazards of the substance. Sim-
ilarly, procedural rulings will be based on the weight of all evidence, un-
like the present rulings which consider only the scant evidence that re-
mains after all non-human and inconclusive or irrelevant human studies
have been ruled inadmissible.
B. Abnormally Dangerous
Under the existing strict liability standard, relaxing plaintiffs' burden
of proof on causation, however necessary from the standpoint of fairness,
would subject manufacturers to inordinate liability. Manufacturers would
be overdeterred and held accountable for injurious effects that were unde-
tectable when the products were marketed.77 Hence, before the burden of
proof shifts to defendant, plaintiffs ought to be required to prove that the
product was "abnormally dangerous" in light of the manufacturer's
knowledge at the time of marketing. The standard suggested here employs
"abnormally dangerous" as a gauge for unreasonable conduct, 8 which
differs from the term's strict liability use in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.7 9 In short, the two-tiered requirement for liability based on quali-
ed. 1983).
77. Although the Allen court did not explicitly balance the qualitative causation standard with
any additional basis for culpability, Judge Jenkins apparently perceived the defendant's dearly negli-
gent behavior as an important factor in the decision to impose liability:
There are serious legal problems here, but legal problems have pragmatic solutions. The statis-
tics can establish the number of 'culpably injured' plaintiffs. If the court can then find a rela-
tionship between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injuries, the defendant has to prove
otherwise. Even where there remains the possibility that the injury would have occurred in the
absence of defendant's conduct . . . doing justice between the parties requires that the party
creating a materially increased risk of that harm bear at least the economic burden of its
consequences.
Yates, The Torts of Last Resort, STUDENT LAW., Apr. 1985, at 28, 31-32 (quoting Jenkins, J.).
78. In fact, despite the no-fault scheme articulated under the strict liability doctrine, courts appar-
ently consider the foresecability of the risk in assessing liability. See Polelle, The Foreseeability Con-
cept and Strict Products Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RuT.-CAM. LJ. 101, 103-09
(1976). Consequently, this proposal would not change the case law but would only make the basis for
judgments more explicit and predictable.
79. In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous under the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, the following factors are to be considered:
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tative causation and unreasonable conduct ensures that incentives to create
necessary products for human use are properly balanced with the need to
deter the manufacture of unsafe products."0 The "abnormally dangerous"
standard rests on foreseeability of harm' and thus incorporates traditional
negligence concepts.8 ' First, the jury must determine whether a hazardous
substance was marketed after the manufacturer "should have known" of
its hazardous nature.83 If the jury confirms such knowledge, it will then
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
80. One of the basic goals of strict liability is to discourage the manufacture of commodities dan-
gerous to the public and encourage the development of higher safety standards by placing the costs of
accidents on those who control the production and distribution of products. See Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (soft drink bottler and distributer liable for explo-
sion of bottle of Coca-Cola, despite neither clear showing of cause of explosion nor proof of plaintiff's
due care). As Justice Traynor noted:
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects that are a
menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the
public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon the manu-
facturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the product, is responsible for
its reaching the market.
Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring).
81. In contrast with this proposal, other courts impose complete liability, without regard to prior
knowledge or foresceability. For example, in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191,
447 A.2d 532 (1982) the court found that "negligence is conduct-oriented, asking whether defendant's
actions were reasonable; strict liability is product-oriented, asking whether the product was reasonably
safe for its foreseeable purposes." Id. at 200, 447 A.2d at 544. In addition, the court noted that "a
major concern of strict liability-ignored by defendants-is the conclusion that if a product was in fact
defective, the distributor of the product should compensate its victims for the misfortune that it in-
flicted on them." Id. at 204, 447 A.2d at 546; see also Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812,
821-22, 579 P.2d 940, 946 (1978) (in wrongful death action resulting from use and exposure to
manufacturer's chemical product, court dismissed negligence action noting that "strict liability (as
distinct from negligence) for a manufacturer's failure to provide adequate warnings does not depend
on the manufacturer's knowledge of the danger"), aff'd as modified, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911
(1979).
82. Traditional negligence differs from the abnormally dangerous standard proposed in this Note
only insofar as "reasonableness" is concerned. Whereas the negligence standard holds defendant to the
level of a "reasonable man," the "abnormally dangerous" standard holds manufacturers to the level of
an expert-responsible for all information available when products are marketed. Whether a particu-
lar manufacturer is aware of the hazards is immaterial since expert knowledge is imputed to every
manufacturer.
83. The standard is based on all relevant information; that is, the supplier is presumed to know
all the dangers that exist in a product at the time it is marketed. Since much of this imputed knowl-
edge will be present in the published toxicology and medical literature, see supra text accompanying
notes 75-76, discovery generally will be unnecessary in the early stages of trial. In addition, the
manufacturer will have a duty to test at least to the level required by the relevant statute. Presently,
pre-testing requirements under a variety of statutes are not met-a consequence of weak or nonexis-
tent enforcement. See supra note 14. With liability based on the duty of manufacturers both to consult
the literature and also to perform all appropriate regulatory tests, as this Note urges, private parties
will not only enforce their own rights in bringing toxic tort suits, but will aid in the policing and
enforcement of a manufacturer's statutory responsibilities.
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employ more traditional strict liability concepts to determine liability,
weighing the costs of the uncertain hazardous risk which the product
presented at the time of marketing 4 against its apparent benefits to soci-
ety. The jury will proscribe a product as "abnormally dangerous" if it
makes both findings: 1) the manufacturer "should have known" of the
hazardous nature of a product; and 2) the costs of the hazard outweighed
its benefits to society at the time of marketing."
Although the cost/benefit approach to "abnormally dangerous" re-
quires case by case inquiry, in most cases juries are likely to weigh the
quantity and quality of animal studies and disaster or occupational re-
ports existing at the time of marketing against the economic and social
utility of the product at that time. These determinations do not involve
complex numerical weighting, but require only that the jury consider
qualitatively which sorts of risks society wishes to assimilate and which it
chooses to deter.88
Because it relies on deterring knowable but unreasonable risk, this "ab-
normally dangerous" standard also comports with traditional cost spread-
ing notions. Manufacturers will be held liable for, and thus have financial
incentives to internalize, the costs of the unreasonable and preventable
risks which their products create. If, on the other hand, the jury deter-
mines that the benefits of the product are considerable, the product may
still be marketed with adequate warnings to alert the user.87 When the
84. Factors to be considered include the normal expectations of the consumer as to the manner in
which the product will be used, complexity of the procedures consumers must follow to use it, magni-
tude of the danger to which the user will be exposed, and likelihood of harm to the user. See Sales,
The Duty To Warn and Instruct for Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 521, 527
(1982).
85. The court in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984) (action
against manufacturer of tetracycline drug for side effect of tooth discoloration) undertook a similar
analysis of "abnormally dangerous," camouflaged as a discussion of strict liability:
[Once the defendant's knowledge of the defect is imputed, strict liability analysis becomes
almost identical to negligence analysis in its focus on reasonableness of the defendant's conduct.
[The standard is] would a person of reasonable intelligence or of the superior expertise of the
defendant charged with such knowledge conclude that defendant should have alerted the con-
suming public?
Id. at 451-52, 479 A.2d at 385-86.
86. The balancing of the costs and benefits of a risky product is a traditional jury function. There
is no more scientific speculation inherent in this decision than in other jury decisions that involve lack
of due care in design cases. Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case Against Comment K and for
Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 873 (1983); but cf Kenney v. Scientific, Inc., 212 N.J.
Super. 6, 512 A.2d 1142 (1986) (court denied jury trial due to complexity of technical scientific
concepts inherent in "more probable than not" causation determination).
87. Warnings are adequate if they provide users with complete information regarding risks, see,
e.g., Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 919,
946-48 (1981); but cf Cooper, Freedom of Choice in the Real World, 34 FooD DRUG COSM. L.J.
612, 618-23 (1979), but federally mandated warnings, standing alone, may not be adequate under the
common law, see, e.g., Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1539-43 (EPA approved warnings on herbicide did not
make warnings adequate as matter of law); Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 624 F.2d 652,
658 (1st Cir. 1981) (manufacturer held liable for failing to include warning that oral contraceptives
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potentially dangerous nature of the product is within reasonable contem-
plation and knowledge of the user, however, the product may not need a
warning.s8
This "abnormally dangerous" standard will also avoid the evidentiary
problems posed by trans-science. The current focus by courts on the via-
bility of competing trans-scientific hypotheses, which attempt to quantify
the untested effects of a substance on humans, will shift to negligence
questions of reasonable conduct. Moreover, such conduct will be adjudi-
cated in light of the published literature and the manufacturer's satisfac-
tory completion of necessary tests-issues which are determinable. As a
result, deterrence will be enhanced in a predictable manner by shifting the
burden of proof to manufacturers who negligently market hazardous
products, despite the trans-scientific inability to quantify such hazards
with certainty.
In sum, basing liability on a qualitative showing of causality and on
proof that the manufacturer acted negligently in marketing an "abnor-
mally dangerous" product will provide a firm basis for deterrence while
conforming to traditional tort requirements.89 It should also be noted that
although the proposed liability standard is intended to address trans-
scientific problems, its use need not be so limited.90 Revising the criteria
upon which a shift in the burden of proof is based insures that negligent
manufacturers must prove that a trans-scientific substance is safe. Thus,
when the issue is no longer trans-scientific and the relevant epidemiologi-
cal studies have been done, or when the manufacturer is able to prove that
the product is not hazardous, that the product did not cause plaintiff's
injury, or that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, then the manu-
facturer may rebut the presumption and shift the burden of proof back to
plaintiff. Although this process may involve an additional burden shift in
taken in high dosages substantially increased risk of cerebral thrombosis, despite fact that existing
warnings were drafted by FDA).
88. See Osterdorf v. Brewer, 51 111. App. 3d 1009, 1013-14, 367 N.E.2d 214, 217 (1977) (plain-
tiff could not recover damages resulting from injury when gasoline cap flew off fuel tank of tractor,
because plaintiff admitted he knew of necessity of tightly securing gasoline cap after refueling).
89. While this Note's proposal does set forth novel proof requirements for "abnormally danger-
ous" products and qualitative causation, these requirements comport with the basic goals of the strict
liability doctrine-cost-spreading and incentives to maximize safety. See, e.g., Ginsberg & Weiss,
Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 859, 905-06
(1981).
90. This proposed standard does not address one set of cases-those in which plaintiffs were
injured by a hazardous substance but the manufacturer cannot be held negligent because detection of
the hazardous nature of the product was beyond the capabilities of contemporary science. Though the
victims deserve compensation, imposing liability on the manufacturer would obviously not further
deterrence. But cf. supra note 81. When a strict liability theory would not provide compensation, the
legislature may wish to intervene and provide a compensation fund for the victims of certain unfore-
seen risks which society chooses to incur in pursuit of technical innovations and scientific progress.
For a brief discussion of such compensation funds, see Trauberman, Compensating Victims of Toxic
Substances: An Analysis of Existing Federal Statutes, 7 HARv. ENVT. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1981).
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cases where the most significant trans-scientific elements have been re-
solved, it does not affect the ultimate basis for imposing liability.
IV. CONCLUSION
Trans-science in toxic torts presents an obstacle in traditional tort liti-
gation which not only produces confusing and inconsistent judgments, but
also makes it difficult or impossible to preserve the goal of deterrence. In
order to accommodate trans-science, the judicial framework must change.
A proposal for reform is suggested in which trans-scientific obstacles can
be circumvented by referring to more predictable notions of qualitative
causation and unreasonable conduct. By adopting such a proposal, the
courts may be able to reincorporate the principle of deterrence into the
adjudication of toxic torts.

